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**CONFLICT ANALYSIS**

**Northern Nigeria Case Study – Structural Drivers and Underlying Causes of Conflict**

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**1. Extract from GSDRC Report – "Conflict drivers, actors and responses in Northern Nigeria: A literature review" October 2014……………………………………………………p 2**

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**1. Extract from GSDRC Report – "Conflict drivers, actors and responses in Northern Nigeria: A literature review" October 2014**

Map of ethnic group concentrations in Nigeria

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**Radicalism**: There is a tradition of both radical Christian and Islamic groups in Northern Nigeria (EPLO, 2012). Radical Islam can be traced back to the Sokoto Caliphate, which was established in the North West of Nigeria through a jihad in 1804, and rigidly implemented Sharia Law (Okpanachi, 2010).

**Pre-colonial and colonial practices:** Colonial practices in the North engendered grievances between Muslim and Christian groups (Aghedo and Osumah, 2014). A significant migration of Southerners to Northern Nigeria followed the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Nigeria protectorates in 1914. In order to avoid disruptions from inter-ethnic conflict, the British and Emirs discouraged the movement of non-Muslim migrants into core Muslim areas, restricting them to separate strangers’ quarters, known as sabon gari (ICG, 2010, p. 5). Over time, a distinction between locals (known as indigenes) and migrants (known as settlers) has emerged as a socio-political issue and provides a basis for continuing conflict (ibid).

**The Islamicisation and Christianisation of politics:** Barna (2014) argues that the extension of Sharia law in 1999 from civil to criminal matters in 12 Northern states is one of the most notable manifestations of political difference between the North and the South. It fuelled a resurgence in identity politics, both in relation to the implementation of Sharia and the reactions to it (Okpanachi, 2010).

**Continuing dissatisfaction over Sharia**: Amongst Muslims, there is a popular perception of the failure of Sharia-inspired laws and policies to improve the lives of Muslim citizens, to reduce inequalities between the North and the South, and to reduce corruption amongst political elites (Kendhammer, 2013, p. 305).

**The politics of zoning:** Zoning is de-facto power sharing arrangement, whereby the presidency is expected to rotate between the Muslim North and the Christian South. The death of President Umuar Musa Yar’Adu (a Northerner) in 2010, and the ascension of President Jonathan (a Southerner) for the remainder of Yar’Adu’s term disturbed this arrangement. President Olusegun Obasanjo (a Southerner) had served two terms from 1999 to 2007, whilst President Yar’Adua had served only one, and many Northerners argued that a Northern candidate should hold office for another term. President Jonathan’s decision to compete for the presidency in 2011, and his subsequent victory fuelled violent protests in Northern Nigeria and are linked to the intensification of Boko Haram’s insurgency (Ploch, 2014, pp. 3-4).

**2. Extract from Crisis Group Africa Report – "Curbing Violence in Nigeria II: The Boko Haram Insurgency" April 2014**

There is an intricate link in Nigeria between politics, governance, corruption, poverty and violence. Politics is largely driven by money. Elected officials are hardly accountable to citizens. The well-connected exercise undue influence according to the strength of their purse and the strings they can pull. The various elite factions – political, economic/business, bureaucratic, traditional and religious – have been drawn into a political economy driven by huge oil receipts and implicated in wide-scale and systemic corruption.

Prices but not salaries have risen. Decaying infrastructure, chronic electricity shortages and an influx of cheaper imported products have led to massive factory closures and worsening unemployment. Educated young people, including a growing number of university and polytechnic graduates, seek ever more elusive jobs. Many youths in the north lack education, have few or no skills and are hardly employable. Idle, they are easily recruited by anti-state and militia groups.

**3. Extract from The Policy Practice Report – "Nigeria: The Political Economy of Reform: Strengthening the Incentives for Economic Growth" September 2007**

7. Since independence Nigeria has experienced several short periods of economic growth, and long periods of stagnation and decline. GDP per capita remains below the level of 1971 in real terms. Over the past three decades poverty rates have increased and income inequality has deteriorated.

8. The reasons for Nigeria’s poor long-term growth performance relate to the misallocation and wasteful use of oil revenues, misguided policy choices, a disabling investment climate, weak and corrupted public institutions, and growing violent conflict. Increasingly these failings are attributed to problems of incentives rooted in institutions and the political economy. In broad terms these features of the political economy have created a framework of incentives that have discouraged wealth creation and focussed energies on competing for state power and patronage in order to gain access to oil revenues and share in rent seeking.

**4. Extract from Human Development Index 2014**

Nigeria ranked 152 out of 187 on the 2014 index.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **HDI rank**  **Out of 187** | **Country** | **Human Development Index (HDI)** | **Life expectancy at birth** | **Mean years of schooling** | **Expected years of schooling** | **Gross national income per capita** | **Human Development Index (HDI)** | **Change in rank** |
|  |  | **2013** | **2013** | **2012** | **2012** | **2013** | **2012** | **2012-2013** |
| 152 | Cameroon | 0,504 | 55,1 | 5,9 | 10,4 | 2,557 | 0,501 | 0 |
| 152 | Nigeria | 0,504 | 52,5 | 5,2 | 9,0 | 5,353 | 0,500 | 1 |
| 154 | Yemen | 0,500 | 63,1 | 2,5 | 9,2 | 3,945 | 0,499 | 0 |

**5. Transparency International Country Profile – Nigeria**

**Corruption Perception Index 2014 Rank 136/175 countries globally**

Corruption Measurement Index 2014 Rank: 136/175 Score: 27/100

Control of Corruption 2010 Percentile Rank: 16% Score: 0.9992708873